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Freede V. Commissioner: Closing a
Loophole Caused by Closing a
Loophole
INTRODUCTION
Congress established personal income taxes nearly 80 years
ago.' Since then, taxpayers have sought ways to avoid paying
taxes. 2 In response, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Con-
gress have tried continually to plug holes in the Code discovered
by innovative taxpayers.' The IRS and the taxpayers frequently
wage battles in the courtroom. 4 The IRS attempts to convince
courts the legislature intended one side while the taxpayers try
to prove the opposite. Many times the taxpayers' battle is futile,
but in other cases, like Freede v. Commissioner,5 the taxpayers
appear to hold the winning hand.
Unfortunately, the holding of Freede teaches a painful lesson
to all taxpayers. Freede won the battle in the Tax Court, 6 but
he lost the war in the court of appeals. 7 Freede thought he had
found a loophole that would allow him to defer his income to
a future period.8 However, when a cash basis taxpayer tries to
I "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. Co~sr. amend. XVI.
I See Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 851 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 859 (1947) (L. Hand, J., dissenting) ("[N]obody owes any public duty to pay
more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions.");
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. granted, 293 U.S. 538
(1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) ("Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes
shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay
the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.").
See P. Dooher, Section 448: New Limitations on the Use of the Cash Method
of Accounting, 28 Tax Mgt. Memorandum 203-08 (August 17, 1987) (available on WL,
TM-TMM database); Rustigan, Important New or Changed Doctrine Emerging from
Recent Tax Shelter Cases, 64 TAXEs 814-23 (Dec. 1986).
4 See cases cited supra note 2.
1 864 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 52 (1989).
6 Freede v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 340 (1986), rev'd, 864 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 52 (1989).
Freede, 864 F.2d at 672-73.
'Id.
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create a loophole by using a statute enacted to close a loophole,
the IRS reacts. This comment discusses the decision by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals9 reversing a Tax Court decision which
appeared to properly interpret the applicable law. The comment
does not suggest the Tenth Circuit was wrong. Instead, the paper
suggests that other issues outside of a strict statutory interpre-
tation played a significant part in the reversal.
I. FREEDE v. COMaSSIONER
The taxpayers in Freede v. Commissioner' were part owners
of several operating leases who contracted with Oklahoma Gas
& Electric (OG&E) under a take-or-pay agreement." The mini-
mum provisions of the take-or-pay contracts required OG&E to
pay for 80°06 of the gas produced from the wells.' 2 OG&E had
the power to recoup any deficiency between the gas taken and
the minimum during the remaining years of the contract. 3 -OG&E
also could compel production equal to 100/0 of the wells' ca-
pacity to recover the deficiency. 4 OG&E paid for, but did not
take, the minimum quantity of oil for 1979, the year at issue."5
Freede contended the contract deficiency was a carved out
production payment 6 and should be treated as a mortgage loan
for tax purposes under section 636(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code. 7 Freede determined that OG&E had carved out a pro-
duction payment in the form of a deficiency subject to recoup-
ment in the remaining years of the contract. Stated another way,
OG&E had made a loan to Freede which would be repaid in
9 See infra notes 44-50, 54-62 and accompanying text.
Freede, 86 T.C. 340. This case consolidates the cases of taxpayers Freede, docket
No. 16339-82, and Folsom, docket No. 20768-82, investors in the leases under review.
Taxpayers' wives are also involved because they filed joint returns. [Hereinafter, refer-
ences to the petitioners will either be to Freede or taxpayer.].
" Freede, 86 T.C. at 342.
12 Id.
11 Id. at 343.
14 Id.
" Id.
16 See [1990] 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 3597.001 ("A carved-out production
payment is one in which the person who creates the payment (Freede) retains the mineral
property while transferring the production payment [to another] (OG&E).").
'7 26 U.S.C. § 636(a) (1982) states in pertinent part:
A production payment carved out of mineral property shall be treated,
for purposes of this subtitle, as if it were a mortgage loan on the property,
and shall not qualify as an economic interest in the mineral property.
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future years when OG&E recaptured the minimum payment
deficiencies accrued in prior years.' 8 Based on section 636(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code, Freede believed he had deferred the
income to a later year.' 9
This treatment would benefit Freede by deferring the tax on
the income to a later period. 20 Deferring income is the purpose
behind section 636(a).2' Congress enacted the statute to reduce
the inequities allowed by the calculation of depletion for mineral
owners." Depletion is calculated based on a percentage of in-
IS See Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(a)(1)(ii) (1973) which states:
The payer of a production payment treated as a loan pursuant to this
section shall include the proceeds from (or, if paid in kind, the value of)
the mineral produced and applied to the satisfaction of the production
payment in his gross income and "gross income from the property" (see
section 613(a)) for the taxable year so applied. The payee shall include in
his gross income (but not "gross income from the property") amounts
received with respect to such production payment to the extent that such
amounts would be includible in gross income if such production payment
were a loan. The payer and payee shall determine their allowable deductions
as if such production payment were a loan.
19 Freede, 86 T.C. at 346. Freede is a cash basis taxpayer who would otherwise
have to recognize income in the period received under 26 U.S.C. § 451(a) (1982) which
provides: "The amount of any item of gross income shall be included in the gross
income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless under the method
of accounting used in computing taxable income, such amount is to be properly ac-
counted for as of a different period." (Emphasis added).
- Freede, 86 T.C. at 346.
2! S. RaP. No. 552, 1969-3 C.B. 423, 538.
n Inequities include taxpayers avoiding limitations based on taxable income and
the ability to pay off what is essentially a loan on pre-tax dollars. See id. at 539-40.
The report gives the following example of the benefits received by oil and gas investors
over other taxpayers:
Assume that A sells an operating business to B-the business may be an oil
well, or it may be an apartment building. However, assume that A retains
the right to a production payment-a payment equivalent to the current
price of a specified number of barrels of oil-or in the case of the apartment
building, a mortgage, which is not much different from the production
payment. Then suppose that A sells the production payment or mortgage
to C.
However the similarity between the oil well and the apartment building
ends here. In the case of the apartment building, all of the rental income
after ordinary expenses and depreciation is taxable income to B and he
must pay off the mortgage out of "after tax" dollars. In the case of the
oil well, however, B is not considered as receiving the production payment
at all -which, in the typical case, may well amount to as much as 90
percent of the income from the well. Thus, in this case B is, in effect,
paying the production payment out of "before-tax dollars." This privilege
of purchasing capital interests out of tax-free income is not a privilege
accorded ordinary taxpayers. At the same time (until recently in the Brooks
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come during the year.Y Mineral owners were abusing the deple-
tion policy by recognizing income as quickly as possible to
generate a higher deduction.Y Section 636(a) corrects this ma-
nipulation by treating income, satisfying the criteria of a pro-
duction payment, as a mortgage loan. The result: a producer's
depletion is more closely matched to the actual production of
income.Y Unfortunately for Freede, the IRS did not like his
attempt to use a loophole in a statute which had been enacted
to close a loophole.
II. The COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
A. The Economic Interest Concept
The Freede controversy centered around the creation by
OG&E of an economic interest in the unremoved minerals. 26 The
case), B, in the case of the oil well, claims the right to take the operating
expenses for the entire well against his share of the income with the result
he is likely to have hardly any taxes to pay while he is acquiring a full
interest in the oil well.
At the same time B is paying little or no tax in the case of the oil well,
C, who is receiving the production payment is receiving cost depletion on
this payment. Thus, he is amortizing his entire cost over the period he
receives his payments.
The C who has the mortgage on the apartment house. fares no better than
his counterpart with the production payment despite the special advantages
of the B with the oil well. The C with the mortgage can spread his cost
over the period of the mortgage, but presumably, any excess he receives is
interest income and therefore ordinary income.
The crucial difference between the A-B-C transaction in oil and the mort-
gage for the apartment, therefore, lies in the treatment of B and the fact
that in the A-B-C transaction B can amortize C's capital interest out of
tax-free dollars rather than the "after-tax dollars" he must use in the
apartment case.
Id.; see also Brountas v. Comm'r, 692 F.2d 152, 155-56 (1st Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1983) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 86-97).
- 26 U.S.C. § 611 (1982) allows a deduction for depletion per the calculation in
Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a) (1960). The calculation can be stated by the following formula:
B = [s/(u + s)], where
B = the adjusted basis of the property; u = units of oil or gas remaining
at the end of the tax year; and s = units of oil or gas sold in the tax year.
H. Wn.Aus & C. MEYERs, 8 On. & GAs LAw MANuAL oF TERs 236 (1988):
4 S. REP. No. 552, supra note 21, at 540.
2 Id.
Freede, 86 T.C. at 347; Freede, 864 F.2d at 673. Both courts recognized Treas.
Reg. § 1.636-3(a)(1) (1973), requiring that five criteria be satisfied before the transaction
is categorized as a production payment. The Tax Court found all five were satisfied and
[VOL. 6:129
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Tax Court believed the rights and obligations of the contract
between the taxpayer and OG&E created an economic interest
in the minerals in place.2 7 In Palmer v. Bender,28 the United
States Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged definition of the
economic interest concept. The two prongs are:
(1) There must be an interest, acquired by a capital
investment, in the minerals in place.
(2) The return on the investment must be realized solely
from the extraction of the minerals."
The Tax Court in Freede determined an economic interest existed
due to OG&E's liability to pay for 80% of production, the right
of recoupment and the ability to control production under the
contract .
30
The court of appeals did not agree with the analysis of the
Tax Court.' The court of appeals listed five factors that must
be satisfied before the first prong of the Palmer test is fulfilled.
3 2
The five factors are: (1) the degree of legal interest in the
minerals; 33 (2) whether there is significant control over the min-
eral deposits;m (3) the extent of contribution to the development
or operation of the mineral extraction;3' (4) the risk of loss;36
and (5) whether the interest is necessarily depleted as the mineral
the Commissioner only challenged the Tax Court's economic interest conclusion in the
appeal. The four factors that are not contested are: (1) OG&E must have a right to a
specified share of gas production; (2) the right must have a specified economic life (at
the time of its creation) of less than the economic life of the mineral property which it
burdens; (3) the right cannot be satisfied by other than the production of gas from the
burdened mineral property; and (4) the right must be limited by either a dollar amount,
a quantum of mineral, or a period of time. Id.
Freede, 86 T.C. at 353.
287 U.S. 551,.557 (1933).
Freede, 864 F.2d at 674; see also Comm'r v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350
U.S. 308, 314 (1956); Rissler & McMurry Co. v. United States, 480 F.2d 684, 686 (10th
Cir. 1973). This standard can also be found in Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(16) (1973).
30 Freede, 86 T.C. at 350.
31 Freede, 864 F.2d at 674.
32 Id.
11 See, e.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 339 F.2d 633, 637 (C. Cl. 1964)
(quoting Sneed, The Economic Interest - An Expanding Concept, 35 TEx. L. Rnv. 307,
355 (1957)) (legal interest, control, and extent of contribution are weighed in determining
the interest in the minerals in place).
-% Id.
33 Id.
I See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Comn'r, 838 F.2d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir. 1987)
(in form over substance test, the party who bears the risk is entitled to deduction).
1990-91]
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is extracted. 7 The court of appeals established that OG&E had
significant control from the contractual rights. However, the
control was "in the nature of a buyer's contractual rights, rather
than as a producer of the gas." ' 38 The fourth factor, a risk of
loss, was also found to exist based on the rights and obligations
established under the contract as discussed by the Tax Court.
3 9
However, the appellate court felt the remaining three factors
had not been satisfied.
B. Legal Title and Take-or-Pay Provisions
The court of appeals took special interest in the legal title to
the land. The legal title to the land would have specific conse-
quences to the legal interest question and to the extent of the
contribution to the mineral extraction. Although Palmer had
held that legal title was unimportant,40 the court took note that
only one case since Palmer, Commissioner v. Southwest Explo-
ration Co.,41 had recognized an economic interest without a fee
interest.4 2 In Southwest Exploration Co., the property owner of.
land adjacent to the mineral-bearing property had an economic
interest because the only way to extract the mineral was through
the property owner's land.
43
In the instant case, the court of appeals considered the
absence of a fee interest significant and critical to the decision.
Also, the lack of interest showed that OG&E had not made a
contribution to the operation or development of the extraction
of the minerals." However, a closer look at the origin of take-
or-pay contracts supports a finding that OG&E had an interest
in the minerals in place and was an integral factor in the ex-
traction of the minerals.
" See, e.g. Kirby Petroleum v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 599, 603 (1946) (because capital
investment is decreased as mineral is removed, taxpayer is entitled to depletion deduc-
tion).
. Freede, 864 F.2d at 675.
" Id. at 676.
,0 Palmer, 287 U.S. at 557; see also Kirby Petroleum Co., 326 U.S. at 603 ("The
technical title to the [mineral] in place is not important.").
" 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
42 Freede, 864 F.2d at 674-75. But see Tidewater Oil Co., 339 F.2d at 638 ("[South-
west] can best be explained on the grounds that the granting of discovery depletion in
that case served the purposes for which the allowance was created.").
41 Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. at 315-16.
" Freede, 864 F.2d at 674-75.
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One issue not discussed by the court of appeals was the
importance of the take-or-pay clause" to the transaction. Prod-
ucers began using take-or-pay provisions to shift the risk of
decreases in demand from producers to purchasers. Previously,
gas contracts locked producers into contracts to supply single
purchasers. When demand decreased, the purchasers would dis-
continue buying gas. 46 The producers were left with no source
of revenues since they could not sell the oil to other purchasers
without violating their contracts. 47 The take-or-pay provision
required the purchasers to acquire a legal interest in the mineral
and provide the necessary resources that would allow producers
to survive a downturn in demand. 48 Compare this to the situation
in Southwest, where the taxpayer had "an interest acquired by
a capital investment, in the minerals in place." 4 9
The transaction in Southwest created an economic interest
because the property owner was essential to the extraction of
the minerals." Similarly, the purchasers' commitment of capital
through the take-or-pay agreement was essential to continued
production by the producer. Without the capital outlay, the
smaller producers would surely have gone under and purchasers
would lose their continuous supply of oil. The Court in South-
west said, "[tihe tax law deals in economic realities, not legal
abstractions, and upon closer analysis, it becomes clear that [the
lack of a legal interest does] not preclude an economic inter-
est. '"5' The economic realities that created take-or-pay provisions
show that an economic interest did exist in the transaction be-
tween Freede and OG&E.
In addition, the interest was created by an investment. Webs-
ter's Third New International Dictionary describes an investment
as "an expenditure of money for income or profit or to purchase
45 A good general discussion of take-or-pay provisions can be found in H. W-
LLOmS, 4 On & GAS LAw § 724.5 (1989). See also Watson, Take or Pay Provisions in
Producer Gas Sales Contracts, RoCKY MN. MiN. L. INST. ON On. & GAS AGREEMENTS
Paper No. 11 (1983).
- Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, Take or Litigate: Enforcing the Plain Meaning of
the Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. Rzv. 185, 190-91 (1987).
47 Id.
4s Id.
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something of intrinsic value; capital outlay. ' 52 The transaction
clearly fits this definition because OG&E supplied cash up front
for a return in subsequent periods. By investing in the production
of gas through the take-or-pay agreement, OG&E ensured a
continuous supply of gas for twenty years. The economic reality
is that OG&E clearly had an interest through investment in the
minerals in place. 3
C. Depletion of Economic Interest Through Mineral Extraction
The first prong's fifth factor of the Palmer test, i.e., whether
the interest is necessarily depleted as the mineral is extracted,
also merits consideration.5 4 The court stated, "[o]nly if OG&E
takes more than the minimum quantity in a given year and elects
to use the excess to reduce its right of recoupment will its
recoupment right be diminished by production." 55 But, consider
what occurs after the tenth year if OG&E's deficiency for the
past ten years has been equal to or greater than 25% of the
minimum. Since.OG&E can only compel 25% additional pro-
duction per year, up to 10001o production from the well,56 after
the eleventh year OG&E will have lost the ability to recoup part
of its investment.57 Thus, the fifth prong could be satisfied,
suggesting this contract does give OG&E more than a mere
economic advantage.
D. The Second Prong-Return on Investment
The court of appeals spent considerable time on the first
prong of Palmer, discussing whether there was an interest, ac-
quired by a capital investment, in the minerals in place. The
' WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1190 (1986). An intrinsic
value is defined as something desired for its own sake without regard to anything else.
Id. at 1186. Although legal definitions do not always comply with common meanings,
courts generally begin a review of terms with their common meanings.
" See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
14 See supra notes 28-37 and text at Section II.
1 Freede, 864 F.2d at 676.
Freede, 86 T.C. at 341 (If required, "the seller was obligated to maintain
deliverability of 125 percent of the minimum contract quantity.").
17 This assumes equal production over the twenty year period. If a twenty-five
percent deficiency occurs in year eleven, after ten years of deficiencies at twenty-five
percent or more, the wells can only produce and return twenty-five percent over nine




discussion was ultimately unnecessary, however, because the court
found the interest failed the second prong.5 8 The court did not
find that OG&E's return on investment had come solely from
the extraction of the minerals. The court, following Helvering
v. Bankline Co. 9 determined OG&E's contract merely estab-
lished an economic advantage.60 This conclusion closely coincides
with the fifth factor under the first prong, i.e., whether OG&E's
recoupment interest was reduced as gas was extracted.6'
The Bankline Court distinguished a contractual advantage
from a capital investment. The Court in Bankline stated, "[t]he
phrase 'economic interest' is not to be taken as embracing a
mere economic advantage derived from production, through a
contractual relation to the owner, by one who has no capital
interest in the mineral deposit." 6 2 In Bankline, a processor con-
tracted with well owners to extract and sell gasoline from the
wellheads. The producer would then pay the owners a share of
the sales proceeds. The Court held that the producer had only
acquired an economic advantage and not an economic interest.
63
The producer had no interest in the minerals in place."
The court of appeals in Freede found that OG&E's relation-
ship was analogous to a customer paying for gas.65 The court
reiterated the position discussed during its review of the first
prong, that there was no legal interest created and that OG&E
played no part in the extraction of the minerals."lHowever, the
same discussion regarding the nature of take-or-pay provisions
shows this situation differed from Bankline.6 OG&E had more
than an economic advantage. The production payment existed
only to the extent of the deficiency and the deficiency is the
property in which OG&E has established a legal interest. After
investing in a continuing supply of gas, OG&E could recover
this interest only by taking gas in subsequent years. OG&E had
legal interest in the minerals that were left for future years under
Freede, 864 F.2d at 676-77.
, 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
"Id.
61 See supra note 37 and text at Section II C.
Bankline, 303 U.S. at 367; see also Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655, 661 (1937).
63 Bankline, 303 U.S. a 367.
- Id.
6 Freede, 864 F.2d at 676.
Id. at 676-77; see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67 See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
1990-911
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the take-or-pay agreement. Without this agreement, Freede could
not continue production of the gas and OG&E would be without
a steady supply.
III. CLosINo LooPHOLES
A. The Purpose Behind Section 636
An appellate court will reverse a finding of law when the
court believes a mistake in application of the law has been
made.68 The court of appeals in Freede believed the Tax Court
misapplied the economic interest concept. The discussion thus
far should raise a question as to why the court found a lack of
an economic interest. Freede merely followed the stated purpose
and direction of the law, so why was his deduction disallowed?
The dissenting opinion in the tax court is one important factor
not mentioned by the court of appeals.6 The dissent recognized
the purpose behind section 636 and declared, "I do not believe,
however, that by taking this step to close one loophole Congress
intended to open another." 70
Section 636 was enacted in large part in response to the
decision in Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc.7' P.G. Lake, Inc. in-
volved a taxpayer who received current payment on an assign-
ment of part of a larger mineral interest.7 The Court allowed
the taxpayer to recognize the payment as income in the current
period.7 The result of this case enabled producers to control
their flow of income by selling enough carved out mineral rights
to offset depletion expense and other deductions.74 Although
enacted more than ten years later, section 636 closed this loop-
hole by requiring treatment of the production payments as mort-
gage loans."
J. QuoATTROcm, FEDERAL TAX REsEAacH 105 (1982).
Freede, 86 T.C. at 353-56 (Nims, J., dissenting; Jacobs, Parr & Williams, JJ.,
agreeing with the dissent).
0Id. at 354.
" Freede, 86 T.C. at 353, citing Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
356 U.S. 260 (1958).
11 Id. at 266-267.
" See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
11 26 U.S.C. 636 (1982); see also S. REP,. No. 552, supra note 21 at 540.
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B. Judicial Review of Tax Avoidance Schemes
Courts have had to review many avoidance schemes created
by innovative taxpayers.76 In the 1970's, oil and gas shelters rose
in popularity because of perceived loopholes like those that
existed after P.G. Lake, Inc.. A court, faced with a decision on
whether or not a loo~hole exists in the Code, has two choices.7
First, courts may judically fix the loophole. The court did
this in a recent tax shelter case, Yosha v. Commissioner .7 In
Yosha, the taxpayer entered into a transaction only for the tax
consequences that would result. No market risk existed in the
taxpayer's investment. Instead of allowing the deduction, the
court held the transaction lacked economic substance. Therefore,
the transaction could be ignored by the court and the IRS.,*
The second option for courts is to allow the taxpayer the
benefit of the loophole. When this occurs, courts state that they
"must take the law as [they] find it."81 First Federal Savings
and Loan Association of Temple v. United States,82 another
recent case, provides an example. In the First Federal case, the
Western District Court of Texas stated, "There is no question
that at first blush an R-4983 transaction smacks of a sham."
But the court continued:
However, on closer analysis of this particular type of ex-
change .... within the structure of the Code, it becomes clear
that there is no valid legal reason for disallowing the loss ....
This Court will not judicially legislate ... where Congress has
specifically addressed the issue and declined to do so .... If
the drafters of Memorandum R-49 were looking for a loophole
11 In 1986, approximately 40,000 tax shelter cases were docketed in the United
States Tax Court. E. Rustigan, Important New or Changed Doctrine Emerging from
Tax Shelter Cases, 64 TAxEs 814 (December 1986). In addition, the IRS estimated that
615,000 cases were in the pre-prosecution stage. Id.
But see Freede, 864 F.2d 671, and discussion infra at Section III D, regarding
a third choice.
73' 861 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988).
' Id. at 500.
o Id.
" First Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n of Temple v. United States, 694 F. Supp.
230, 249 (w.D. Tex. 1988).
I ld.
R-49 is a regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, a regulating body
for savings and loans. Id. at 233. The regulation allowed recognition of a loss on
exchange of like-kind assets, which was contested by the Commissioner. Id.
" Id. at 249.
1990-91]
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in the tax laws, then the only response can be that they have
found one. 5
C. Brounlas v. Commissioner
In an example of judicial review of section 636(a), the section
at issue in Freede, the First Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with
the congressional intent behind section 636. In Brountas v.
Commissioner", the court held that Congress did not intend to
create avoidance schemes under section 636.7 Brountas con-
cerned an oil and gas tax shelter which had been set up to obtain
tax benefits for investors through the use of nonrecourse fi-
nancing88 Investors in the tax shelter would contribute a lump
sum note payable out of production if the wells were produc-
tive. s9 If the wells did not produce oil, the drilling company
could only look to the property, not the investor, for repayment
of the note.90
The taxpayer in Brountas argued that nonrecourse notes
became production payments since the notes would be repaid
from future productions. 9' Therefore, the note should be treated
like a mortgage loan and increase the taxpayer's partnership
basis. 92 The effect was to circumvent the contingent nature of
the loan and allow a deduction greater than the initial capital
outlay.93 But the First Circuit Court of Appeals did not agree. 94
" Id.
" 692 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1983). But see Gibson
Products Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981) (under nearly identical
facts, the court did not reach the question of statutory intent).
Brountas, 692 F.2d at 158-61.
Nonrecourse notes have been the subject of controversy since Crane v. Comm'r,
331 U.S. 1 (1947). The result of Crane was that nonrecourse liabilities were includible
in the taxpayer's basis for property. See also B. Bittker & M. McMahon, Federal Income
Taxation of Individuals, 26.16 at 26-40 (1988) ("Crane laid the cornerstone for the
tax shelter frenzy of the 1960's, 1970's and early 1980's.").




Increasing the partnership basis was critical to Brountas' loss deduction. The
tax shelter requires a cash contribution, here, $4,000, and assumption of a nonrecourse
liability, in this case $6,000. 26 U.S.C. § 263(c) (1982) and Treas. Reg. § 1.612.-4(a)
(1965) allow intangible drilling costs (IDC's) to be deducted during the year incurred.
IDC's in the transaction were $7,500. But, since losses are only deductible to the extent
of basis under 26 U.S.C. § 704(d) (1982), Brountas had to prove the nonrecours6 debt
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CLOSING A LOOPHOLE
The court focused on the purpose of section 636(a). The
congressional purpose of section 636(a) seeks to limit the accel-
eration of income so there is "no avoidance of the limitation
on the percentage depletion deduction."" The First Circuit con-
cluded that the nonrecourse notes were not production payments
since the effect would reach the opposite result of the statute's
intent. 96 "[T]he language is best taken as a general instruction
to view the whole transaction in a way that carries out the
section's purpose.'' 97
D. Freede Follow-up
Both the Tax Court dissent and the appellate opinion in
Freede used what may be termed as a third judicial approach to
loopholes-ignore them. Neither court really "ignored" the issue
of the intent of section 636. Instead, the courts focused their
discussions on the economic interest issue." Since neither the
Tax Court dissent nor the Court of Appeals believed that Freede
created a production payment, the tax avoidance question did
not have to be reached. The result would have been unchanged;
only the logic would be different. Using the Brountas analysis,
the courts could have avoided the confusion of the economic
interest concept. Because the intent of section 636 is to prevent
avoidance of taxation, this provision was not applicable to
Freede's situation.
CONCLUSION
Determination of the existence of an economic interest is
complex and difficult. 99 Many courts have disagreed since the
should be added to his cash basis. That is the question addressed by the court. Id. at
155-56.
9 Id. at 158-61; see also Zappo v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 77, 88 ("A note or obligation
will not be treated as a true debt for tax purposes when it is highly unlikely, or impossible
to estimate, whether and when the debt will be repaid.").
S. REp. No. 552, supra note 21 at 540.
" Brountas, 692 F.2d at 155-56; see Comment, Nonrecourse Financing: Does It
Still Generate Tax Advantages After Gibson Products Co. v. United States and Brountas
v. Comm'r?, 4 N. ILL. L. RHv. 153, 173 (Winter 1983) (Brountas used three analytical
approaches to control or eliminate the use of nonrecourse financing for oil and gas
partnership).
',Brountas, 692 F.2d at 160.
,Freede, 864 F.2d at 676-77; Freede 86 T.C. at 354-56.
E. Fenton & P. Davis, The Economic Interest Concept: A Historical & Policy
Perspective, 3 J. MiN. L. & PoL'Y 75, 76 (1987-88). In addition to reviewing the history
of cases that shaped the economic interest concept, the authors also suggest a quantitative
method for analyzing a potential economic interest. Id. at 105-11.
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Palmer decision over 55 years ago. 100 On the surface, the reversal
by the Freede appellate court'0 may simply be explained as a
correction of misapplied law. But, when a lower court appears
to follow the precise wording of a statute and the related regu-
lations, more than a disagreement of interpretation is suspected.
Courts will not look favorably at an attempt to use a statute
that closes a loophole as another loophole, because the intent
of Congress to prevent tax avoidance is apparent. Freede and
other taxpayers with similar opportunities must look further than
the words in the statute. Congress' intent is the key to finding
a loophole. If the court of appeals had argued congressional
purpose, the discussion would be different, but the end result,
denial for Freede, -would remain the same.
Gregory R. Schaaf
10 Palmer, 287 U.S. 551.
10, Freede, 864 F.2d 671.
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